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Abstract
The aim of  this paper is to systematize the available material on the role played by 
Austria-Hungary in America’s entry into the Great War. Particular focus is placed on the 
part Hungary played, as well as the situation of  the Hungarian immigrants living in the 
United States during this time period (1914–1918), and to what extent their lives were 
affected during these years. The research utilizes a wide range of  secondary sources, as 
well as contemporary articles from American and Hungarian newspapers, and, to some 
degree, primary sources also. The federal government and major leaders such as Theo-
dore Roosevelt were concerned with the insidious acts of  the German and Ottoman Em-
pires, but they were much less anti-Austrian or anti-Hungarian which is intriguing given 
the fact that the war was in effect instigated by Austria-Hungary. This paper examines 
this question in detail by analyzing the events leading up to April, 1917, investigating the 
involvement of  Hungarians in American aggression, and discussing the social backlash 
such actions provoked.
Keywords: World War One, belligerence, United States, Austria-Hungary, immigration, 
Hungarian-Americans, espionage
I. Introduction
On April 6, 1917, the United States of  America officially entered World War One. In 
little less than the three years between 1914 and 1917, the Union had moved from an 
absolute rejection of  violence to an enthusiastic support of  the war effort. In his well- 
documented, thorough analysis of  American society during the war, Michael S. Neiberg 
pointed out that contrary to common belief, Americans did not follow blindly a President 
with Messiah syndrome, and neither did they fall victim to the evil schemes of  a mysteri-
ous “international financial elite”. For American society, the path to war was paved with 
news of  outrageous acts committed by the Central Powers, more specifically the German 
and Ottoman Empires, which included aggression against Belgium, the massacres of  Ar-
menians in Turkey, unrestricted submarine warfare, a series of  sabotages on American 
soil,2 the sinking of  Lusitania and the attempts to provoke a war between Mexico and the 
U.S. Such actions made it clear to most Americans that they could not afford to let the 
2 See Tracie Provost, “Spy Games: German Sabotage and Espionage in the United States, 
1914–1916.” FCH Annals: The Journal of the Florida Conference of Historians 22 ( June 2015): 123–136.
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Central Powers win the war.3 Although Woodrow Wilson won his second term in Novem-
ber, 1916 with the slogan “He kept us out of  the war”, it was only a few months later, at 
the beginning of  1917, that many Americans waited for the overt act justifying their entry 
into the war on the side of  the Entente. Neiberg argues that American society was watch-
ing events very closely, and their support of  hostility instead of  isolationism was a much 
more informed opinion on their part than the academic literature previously suggested. 
According to Neiberg, this change of  view was based on three fundamental points. 
First, America recognized that securing Europe’s future meant securing their own as well: 
“Europe may have been over there, but it was also close to home.” Second, they collectively 
believed that by not having any part in instigating the conflict, they were acting in self- 
defense and in the interests of  mankind against German imperialism. Third, they realized 
that their different ethnic identities meant less to them than their common American 
identity.4
The title of  this paper reflects an interesting idea. Germany had played a crucial 
role in the three years leading up to American entering hostilities, and, although the US 
officially never declared war on it, the Ottoman Empire also played a role in convincing 
American society to support entering the war. But little is known about the role of  the 
other great aggressor country among the Central Powers: Austria-Hungary. This paper 
aims to systematize the information available on the involvement of  Austria-Hungary, 
more importantly Hungarians, in the American entry into the Great War. The situation of  
Hungarian immigrants living in the United States during this period is of  particular con-
cern, and in particular how their lives were affected during the war. This research is mak-
ing use of  a wide range of  secondary sources, and contemporary newspaper pieces, both 
American and Hungarian, and, to some degree, primary sources as well. An examination 
of  the secondary literature makes it clear that  the insidious acts of  the German and 
Ottoman Empires influenced the United States’ decision to enter the war against the 
Central Powers in 1917; however, Austria-Hungary and Hungarian Americans did con-
siderably less to provoke them than their allies, yet their involvement ought not to be 
overlooked.
3 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How the First World War Created Modern America (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2016), 222.
4 Neiberg, The Path to War, 235.
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II. Historical Background: The United States and the First World War
It is common knowledge that the First World War began following the assassination of  
Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of  the Empire when Austria-Hungary declared war 
on Serbia. The reigning monarch, Franz Joseph I, was wary about declaring war on Serbia 
for fear of  an attack by the Russian Empire, protecting their fellow Slavic country in the 
name of  pan Slavism, but more importantly for defending its own political interests in 
the Balkans region. But with the encouragement of  the German Emperor Wilhelm II, 
and after the Serbian rejection of  the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, Franz Joseph signed 
the declaration of  war. The plan for Austria-Hungary was to quickly defeat Serbia, opti-
mally before Russia could mobilize, but in case their military operations took longer than 
expected, Germany would hold the Russian forces at bay.5 Of  course, events did not go 
to plan and four years of  bloodshed ensued the like of  which had never been witnessed 
before.
The World War marked the first great international conflict between the United 
States and countries that had large immigrant populations in the Union. Although the 
war was instigated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, their aggression against Serbia is 
given less attention in “Western” historiography than the German attack on Belgium.6 
The same was true in the case of  the British, and French, and was also true for American 
newspapers of  the time. Belgium was referred to as “Brave Little Belgium”, or “Poor 
Little Belgium”, and people in these countries, especially in the USA were outraged by the 
“brute force” Germany employed when they overran Belgium without a proper declara-
tion of  war.7 These acts of  violence, alongside several others during the course of  the war, 
went a long way in convincing American society to abandon their pacifism. 
5 József Galántai, Szarajevótól a háborúig: 1914. július [From Sarajevo to the War. July 1914] (Budapest: 
Kossuth, 1975), 
6 By “Western” historiography, I mean here the academic literature from mostly the Anglo-Saxon na-
tions and France.
7 See Christophe Declercq, “From Antwerp to Britain and Back Again” in Languages and the First 
World War: Representation and Memory, eds. Christophe Declercq and Julian Walker (London: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016), 94.
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Figure 1: Destroy this mad brute - one of  the best known  
American WWI propaganda posters8
Figure 1 is one of  the most recognizable examples of  how the German Empire was 
presented to the American public. In Harry R. Hopps’ painting Germany is depicted as a 
huge ape in a German military helmet, gripping a bloody club in one hand, and holding 
a helpless woman, Lady Liberty, in the other. The poster is essentially a visual representa-
tion of  Woodrow Wilson’s speech to Congress on April 2, 1917, in which he stated that 
the United States was preparing to fight Germany because it had proved to be a menace 
to world peace and indeed, civilization itself.9
The German role in provoking American hostilities is recognized and well- 
documented. Following this short introduction, the next section attempts to discover how 
big of  a role Hungarians played in this particular story. But before doing so, it seems nec-
essary to briefly outline how such a great number of  Hungarians came to be in the USA.
8 The original source of the image is the website of the Library of Congress: https://www.loc.gov/ex-
hibitions/static/world-war-i-american-experiences/images/objects/over-here/wwi0025-standard.jpg
9 Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations. Volume III. The Globalizing of America, 
1913–1945. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.), 41.
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III. Historical Background: Hungarians in the USA
Hungarian immigration to the United States was at an all-time high in the years preceding 
the Great War. There are several statistics attesting to the extent of  immigration. An un-
interrupted record of  immigration to the US began in 1819; the Act of  1819 required the 
captains of  all vessels arriving into the US from abroad to produce a list or manifest of  all 
passengers to the local authorities. Immigration statistics were compiled by the Depart-
ment of  State between 1820 and 1870, by the Treasury Department, Bureau of  Statistics, 
between 1867–1895; and since 1892, by a separate Office or Bureau of  Immigration, as 
a part of  the Immigration and Naturalization Service.10 One of  the problems with the 
statistical data is that they usually show significant differences based on the place of  origin 
and the location where the data was recorded: US immigration statistics, records taken at 
the place of  boarding (e. g. Bremen or Hamburg in Germany, etc.), and the emigration 
statistics of  the countries of  origin are dissimilar in many cases.11 Another problem is that 
immigration statistics are primarily based on headcounts, namely the aforementioned ship 
manifests or passenger lists. But a great number of  immigrants took the journey to the 
USA to find employment, save money and then return to their respective home countries 
to invest their new-found wealth in businesses, land or property. Since many undertook 
this process several times, it was not uncommon for individuals to appear in the statistics 
every time they travelled to America. So as a result, some people were counted multiple 
times which distorts the figures. Immigration statistics do not take generally this phenom-
enon into consideration, so consequently, there are no accurate accounts on the exact 
number of  immigrants.12
Hungarians, along with nationals from a dozen other Central- and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, arrived into the USA in great numbers in the period known as the Third 
Immigration Wave, between about 1881 and 1914. This period brought more than 23 
million new immigrants from mostly European countries, to the US. In the first decade of  
the period, most immigrants arrived from Northern and Western Europe, but after 1890, 
the majority came from southern and eastern Europe.13 Naturally, there had been other, 
although considerably smaller waves of  Hungarian immigrants, but none of  those can be 
10 US. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC, 
1975), 97.
11 Julianna Puskás, Kivándorló mag yarok az Eg yesült Államokban 1880–1940 [Hungarian Immigrants in 
the United States] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982.) 443–446.
12 Julianna Puskás, Ties That Bind, Ties That Divide. 100 Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States 
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 2000), 21.
13 Carl L. Bankston III., ed. Encyclopedia of American Immigration (Pasadena: Salem Press, 2010), 558.
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compared to the 1890–1914 period. The main reasons for this were the immigration acts 
of  1921 and 1924, which essentially put an end to mass immigration to the US.14
Figure 2: Line chart of  Hungarian Immigration to the USA throughout history15
Figure 2 illustrates the extent of  Hungarian immigration to the USA. Although, 
it shows just one variation of  the several available statistics, the chart is still suitable for 
demonstrating that the peak of  Hungarian immigration was in the decade prior to the 
First World War. So, when war broke out, more Hungarians were living and working in 
the United States than ever before. Of  course, for the sake of  preciseness, a distinction 
must be made between Hungarians (Magyars) and non-Hungarians (e. g. Slovaks, Czechs, 
Poles, Croatians, Serbs, etc.) from the territory of  Austria-Hungary.
Gross migration from the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the First World War can 
be put at three million people, the majority of  which arrived after 1899. Of  all Austro- 
Hungarian immigrants, an estimated one and a half  million arrived from the territory 
of  the Kingdom of  Hungary.16 Yet this figure does not show how many Hungarians (by 
14 Bankston, Encyclopedia, 533–537.
15 The data in the chart is based on the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, published by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. Bankston, Encyclopedia, 507.
16 Puskás, Ties That Bind, 21.
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which secondary sources usually mean people who spoke Hungarian as a mother tongue) 
travelled to the USA in this period with accuracy. According to Hungarian census statis-
tics, only 48.1 per cent of  the population living in the Kingdom of  Hungary considered 
themselves Hungarians in 1910.17 Unlike other eastern European nations, more than 99 
per cent of  immigrants claiming Magyar as a mother tongue were from the same country. 
But conversely, only 46 per cent of  immigrants from Hungary were actually Magyars.18
When it comes to determining how many Magyars were living in the United States 
during World War One, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate number. The US federal cen-
suses of  1910 and 1920 are certainly helpful, but there are several important factors to 
be taken into consideration. Firstly, one should examine the flow of  immigration to the 
USA on a yearly basis between 1910 and 1914. The outbreak of  the Great War halted im-
migration – the number of  immigrants arriving during the war was negligible so the years 
after 1914 can be eliminated from the calculation. The yearly numbers of  Hungarian im-
migrants should be added to the results of  the 1910 census but the calculation would still 
not be accurate. This leads us to the second methodological issue. As mentioned before, 
a sizeable number of  migrants sailed to the United States with the intention of  working 
there temporarily. As Steven Béla Várdy, a noted Hungarian American historian puts it:
They were driven from their homeland by economic privation, and drawn to the United 
States by the economic opportunities of  a burgeoning industrial society. Most of  them were 
young males who came as temporary guest workers with the intention of  returning to their 
homeland and becoming well-to-do farmers.19
A not inconsequential number of  these individuals repeated the journey several 
times over the course of  a few years. Consequently, to determine the number of  Hun-
garians in the US during the war, it would be necessary to eliminate the occasions of  
re-migration, which would in essence mean registering every single immigrant worker 
by name in a database, a task that would prove momentous – even for a research team. 
According to Julianna Puskás, the numbers involved can be put somewhere around at 1.8 
million people.20
17 László Katus, Hungary in the Dual Monarchy 1867–1914. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.), 
167.
18 Roger Daniels, Coming to America. A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life (New York: 
Perennial, 2002), 232.
19 Steven Béla Várdy, Mag yarok az Újvilágban [Hungarians in the New World] (Budapest: 2000). 744.
20 Puskás, Ties, 21.
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IV. “The Conflict of  Loyalties”
Julianna Puskás calls the 1914–1918 period “The Conflict of  Loyalties”,21 
which could not be more accurate in respect of  the Hungarian immigrants living in the 
USA that time. This split loyalty was not unusual and is similar to what other immigrant 
nationals faced: they had to decide whether their original ethnicity, or their new, American 
identity was more important to them.22 But this was not necessarily a major talking point 
in the first years of  the war, while the US maintained its neutral position in respect to the 
war. In this period (1914, and a main segment of  1915), a lot of  Hungarians felt a sense 
of  responsibility for those remaining in the old country, some others even expressed their 
patriotism by notifying the Hungarian Embassy of  their intention to join the Hungarian 
army. 
What made life very difficult for Hungarian Americans was the fact that they ended 
up in the crosshairs of  both the Hungarian government and American society. The Hun-
garian government announced that anybody of  Hungarian citizenship who worked in 
American weapons factories or any other military plants were considered enemies of  the 
state of  Hungary, and were to be subjected to 10 to 20 years in prison, or even to capital 
punishment. For instance in South Bethlehem, PA, one Hungarian immigrant described 
the situation as follows:
For weeks now the Austrians working here have been troubled by reports scattered broadcast 
that if  they did not stop making shells for the allies, they would be put in prison and, in some 
cases, be executed as traitors if  ever they dared return to their country!23
Interestingly, after the announcement appeared in Hungarian newspapers in the 
USA, the number of  Hungarians applying for American citizenship grew considerably.24 
Hungarian immigrants also felt the need to help with the old country’s war effort and 
so in several ways. Their associations in the USA organized charity events and bazaars 
to raise money for medical supplies, which were sent to Hungarian soldiers via the Red 
Cross. They purchased Hungarian war bonds. They even prayed in their churches for the 
victory of  the homeland, the soldiers’ lives, and those remaining in the hinterland.25 These 
acts of  patriotism towards the Old World by Hungarian Americans most certainly raised 
some eyebrows among their native-born acquaintances.
21 Puskás, Ties, 179.
22 Neiberg, The Path to War, 235.
23 Dean Halliday, “Ammunition Makers Are Glad Dumba Must Leave,” The Day Book, (IL) September 
14, 1915. 8.
24 Miklós Szántó, Mag yarok Amerikában [Hungarians in America] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1984), 63.
25 Puskás, Ties, 179.
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Figure 3: Ambassador Dumba26
One of  the major scandals concerning Hungarians during the course of  the war 
was the infamous Dumba Affair. Konstantin Theodore Dumba (1856–1947) was the last 
Austro-Hungarian diplomat accredited to serve as Ambassador to the United States. He 
was in office from March 4, 1913 to November 4, 1915. Dumba, in a letter he had sent 
to his government, admitted to being part of  a scheme that attempted to use strikes and 
sabotage by immigrant workers to keep American companies from fulfilling their con-
tracts with Allied states.27 In the documents found by the British Royal Navy, ambassador 
Dumba had proposed a plan to “disorganize the manufacture of  munitions of  war” in 
the United States. As a part of  this scheme, Dumba also suggested funding a number of  
foreign-language newspapers published in America to influence Hungarian laborers. The 
Wilson administration was naturally outraged by this scheme and deemed it a particularly 
dangerous attempt to take advantage of  the heterogeneous population of  the USA.28 
Consequently, Dumba was soon recalled from service.
26 The source of the image: William Seale, The Imperial Season: America’s Capital in the Time of the First Am-
bassadors, 1893–1918 (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2013), 199.
27 Puskás, Ties, 180.
28 Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes. The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1995), 18.
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Prior to this incident, Dumba had been fairly popular among both the Hungarian 
community in America and the political elite back in Hungary. Several months before 
his dismissal, the Szeged-based daily newspaper Délmagyarország [Southern Hungary] 
praised Dumba for his excellent work as Ambassador, and quoted him on the importance 
of  the neutrality of  the United States.29 Another Hungarian newspaper, Esztergom és 
Vidéke [Esztergom and Its Surroundings] also held Dumba in high esteem, praising a 
foreword he authored for a Hungarian-American propaganda pamphlet written by Ernő 
Ludwig, Hungarian Consul for the State of  Ohio.30 On October 26, 1915, with reference 
to the German newspaper Vossische Zeitung, Délmagyarország wrote that King Franz 
Joseph awarded a noble title to Dumba.31 It is worth noting that this news article was 
published less than two weeks before he was disgraced and took his leave from office. 
Ironically, Dumba contradicted these flattering articles with his own behavior as Ambas-
sador: he talked about the importance of  American neutrality, and yet was the one who 
attempted to organize a dangerous sabotage that could possibly have been used as a casus 
belli against Austria-Hungary.
This infamous affair shed an ill light on Hungarian Americans, who, according 
to newspapers of  the time, sought to dissociate themselves from Dumba. Other Aus-
tro-Hungarian peoples jumped at the opportunity to take advantage of  the situation and 
use Dumba’s case to express their loyalty to America. The Slovaks for example, did not 
hesitate to send letters to major newspapers, labelling Austria-Hungary an oppressive 
state and denouncing the activities of  Ambassador Dumba.32 But Hungarians also ex-
pressed relief  when the ambassador was recalled, Hungarians and Austrians of  South 
Bethlehem celebrated together in the streets.33
After Dumba was recalled, Franz Joseph declined to appoint a new Ambassador to 
the USA, which made Dumba the last Hungarian diplomat to occupy such a high level in 
America. Dumba went on to serve as an Austrian diplomat for decades after the war. In 
his memoirs, published in 1932, he attempted to defend his actions in 1915 by sharing his 
own side of  the story.34
29 “A monarchia amerikai nagykövete a háborúról” [American Ambassador of the Monarchy Weighs in 
on the War], Délmag yarország, February 23, 1915, 7.
30 László Kőrösy, “Amerikai honfitársainkról [On Our Fellow Countymen in America],” Esztergom és 
Vidéke, August 22, 1915, 1.
31 “Dumbát kitünteti a király” [Dumba to be Awarded by the King], Délmag yarország, October 26, 1915, 
5.
32 Slovaks’ Denounce Dumba, New York Tribune, (NY) September 16, 1915, 6.; or Slovak Citizens Praise 
Dismissal of Doctor Dumba, The Bridgeport Evening Farmer, (CT) September 20, 1915, 4.
33 Halliday, Ammunition Makers, 8.
34 Constantin Dumba, Memoirs of a Diplomat (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1932).
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Similarly to the Dumba-case, American Secret Service agents managed to seize sev-
eral documents (mostly correspondence) from German and Austro-Hungarian officials, 
that proved schemes were afoot that aimed to sabotage American factories and shipyards. 
One example of  this was the capture of  Dr. Heinrich Albert, a German commercial at-
taché, who worked for the Hamburg-Amerika line office in lower Manhattan. According 
to embellished versions of  the story, federal agents arrested Albert after an exciting chase 
through the New York subway. In his briefcase, the agents found plenty of  incriminating 
documents, outlining several German and Austro-Hungarian plots to undermine Amer-
ican neutrality. These plots included, apart from the “usual” proposals to buy American 
newspapers and publish propaganda, bribe politicians and instigate strikes, plans to com-
mit acts of  industrial sabotage. The documents served as evidence that Berlin and Vien-
na were organizing bomb attacks against American factories in Bethlehem, Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, New Jersey, and several other cities where there were large populations of  
Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians.35 Obviously, the documents angered the Americans 
but this anger was aimed mostly at Germany, and the role played by Austria-Hungary was 
dwarfed by her great ally. Moreover, Germany continued to occupy center stage when, 
in another set of  seized documents, German commercial attaché Franz von Papen called 
Americans “idiotic Yankees”, who should “shut their mouths and better still be full of  
admiration” for German power.36 Consequently, journalists hounded Papen from Yellow-
stone National Park to San Francisco, on a journey which ultimately transpired to be a trip 
to a meeting where further plans of  sabotage would have been discussed.
Based on the Hungarians’ economic and spiritual support of  their homeland, and 
incidents like the Dumba and the Albert Affairs, suspicion of  where their loyalties lay 
increased gradually. These acts were not in keeping with President Wilson’ efforts to 
encourage “hyphenated” Americans37 to embrace their new, American identity and leave 
behind their old one.38 These “hyphenated” Americans came by the millions from South-
ern and Eastern Europe in the three decades prior to the start of  the Great War, and 
typically settled in enclaves where they spoke their own language, ate their national cuisine 
foods, read their ethnic newspapers, and found support in their community’s social orga-
nizations. Although, they did retain many of  their native traditions, they also adopted key 
35 Neiberg, The Path to War, 78–79.
36 Neiberg, The Path to War, 79.
37 Immigrants with multiple identities such as Italian-Americans, or Hungarian-Americans.
38 See Hans P. Vought, The Bully Pulpit and the Melting Pot. American Presidents and the Immigrant, 1897–1933 
(New York: Mercer, 2004), 94–120.
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elements of  American culture.39 Some of  the immigrant national groups were expressly 
opposed to American aggression, and were adamant in their support of  neutrality. For ex-
ample, the National German-American Alliance, the Irish Ancient Order of  Hibernians, 
and other ethnic organizations along with editors of  ethnic newspapers joined together 
to convince the U.S. government to maintain neutrality. Of  course, German and Irish 
American motives were different: the former did not want the USA to fight against their 
homeland, and naturally, the latter did not want the USA to actively help Britain, their 
longtime oppressor.40 On the other hand, several other nationals wished to convince the 
U.S. government to enter the war as soon as possible, most of  whom were originally from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The fear of  the enemy within was incessant during the war years reaching its peak 
in 1917. Based chiefly on the very real provocation activity conducted by German sab-
oteurs, Wilson was actively fearmongering against immigrants. In a speech given before 
Congress, he said the following.
There are citizens of  the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but wel-
comed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of  Amer-
ica, who have poured the poison of  disloyalty into the very arteries of  our national life… 
Such creatures of  passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out.41
Of  course, these fears of  an enemy inside were present throughout American so-
ciety. Consequently, when the USA entered the war on April 6, 1917, the federal govern-
ment took stern measures to deal with the situation of  immigrants from enemy countries. 
This resulted in such measures as the Espionage and Sedition Acts, the Enemy Alien 
Proclamation, or the Enemy Alien Act. These sought to introduce certain restrictions 
against Germans, and later against citizens of  their allies. In May 18, 1917, the Selective 
Service Act was passed, which created the Selective Service System. According to this, all 
non-citizen males were required to register, but not all were required to serve, and those 
deemed “enemy aliens” were forbidden to serve.42 By November, 1917, the USA declared 
war with Austria-Hungary, too, so all nationals of  the Empire (Czechs, Slovaks, Croatians, 
Hungarians) became “technical enemy aliens”, too. Later, after persistent protests from 
39 Nancy Gentile Ford, The Great War and America. Civil-Military Relations during World War I (Westport: 
Praeger, 2008), 54.
40 Ford, Civil-Military Relations, 2008. 54.
41 David M. Kennedy, Over Here. The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 24.
42 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You. World War I and the Modern American Citizen (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.). 31.
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Czech and Slovak groups,43 this approach was changed to the degree that more immi-
grants were conscripted than their proportional representation in the population.44
As for the majority of  Hungarian immigrants living and working in America – at 
least, those of  an apolitical persuasion – they tried to retain a level of  neutrality. Of  course, 
many from minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire engaged in attempts to persuade 
Americans how their independence movements were in line with the war aims of  the 
United States. In a way, it was a means for them to show that their enemy alien status was 
only of  a technical type. The Magyars on the other hand, did not share the same enthusi-
asm for opposing Austria-Hungary, or if  they did, they did not express it. Most Hungarian 
immigrants remained silent regarding the war. This situation resulted in the very different 
treatment meted out Austro-Hungarians than that received by the Germans after the 
declaration of  war with their country of  origin. One example for this variance was Wil-
son’s decision to refrain from applying to the subjects of  the Dual Monarchy any of  
the enemy alien regulations levelled against German aliens.45 This made it possible for 
Hungarian-born individuals to register for the draft and volunteer to fight in the American 
military in 1917 and 1918. The federal government was ready to use the military training 
to better facilitate Americanization. Initially, the Army created “development battalions” 
in which foreign nationals received instruction in the English language, American history, 
and government.46 Later, after witnessing the effectiveness of  the Army’s Americaniza-
tion methods, the government in 1918 simplified the naturalization process for men in 
military service. In this way, the war had a positive influence on American society, by gal-
vanizing assimilation and facilitating the emergence of  the new, modern American citizen.
This was something that made volunteering for military service highly desirable for 
many foreign-born individuals, including Hungarians. In fact, only a small proportion, 
approximately 22 per cent of  Hungarians, requested exclusion from the draft upon regis-
tration, and most did so for health reasons, or to support their families. A very small num-
ber exempted themselves on ideological/moral grounds citing a “refusal to fight abroad”, 
43 See Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans All! Foreign-born Soldiers in World War I (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2001) 30–44.
44 Peter Karsten, Encyclopedia of War & American Society (Pittsburgh: SAGE Publications, 2006), 946.
45 John Higham, Strangers in the Land. Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 
1988), 217.
46 Kennedy, Over Here, 158.
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“don’t want to serve”, “I am against war”, or “exempt fight against brother”.47 But the 
vast majority of  Hungarians were open to  registering and possibly serving in the United 
States Armed Forces in the war. Ultimately, some 3000 Hungarians served in the Armed 
Forces of  the United States during the First World War.48
V. Closing Remarks
In conclusion it should be noted that although there were incidents involving Hungarians 
or Austria-Hungary, the available evidence shows that the American government and 
American society were focused on their grievances towards Germany, and the Ottoman 
Empire. Acts such as the attack on Belgium without a proper declaration of  war, the mass 
murder of  Armenians, or the provocation of  Mexico to attack the USA caused much 
more outrage than the Austrian attack of  Serbia for example, which was the catalyst war 
in the first place.
Incidents like the Dumba Affair, and several attempts at industrial sabotage, were 
apparently dwarfed by the number of  offences committed by Germany and thus proved 
to be insufficient to provoke the anger of  American society. The federal government 
and major leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt were concerned with the insidious acts 
of  the German and Ottoman Empires, and this antagonizing narrative could be found 
in all forms of  printed press: newspapers, magazines, propaganda posters, etc. However, 
specifically anti-Austrian and anti-Hungarian propaganda was insignificant compared to 
other Central Powers, which is intriguing considering that the war was in effect started by 
Austria-Hungary. Although Hungarian-born individuals could experience hostility from 
American society, it was isolated and did not compare to what their German-born coun-
terparts had to endure, especially after April, 1917.49
The United States entered the war in 1917 acting as a savior, a strong protector of  
the weak against the archetypal bully. Americans regarded themselves innocent in that 
they did not have anything to do with the outbreak of  the war, thus regarding themselves 
morally superior to all the other aggressor countries on both sides. The nefarious bullies 
were Germany and the Ottoman Empire, but the third Central Power, which despite 
47 From the author’s original research based on a representative sample of some 1200 Hungarian re-
gistrants who filled out Draft Registration Cards in 1917–1918. The database is based on the fol-
lowing record group: US National Archives M-1509 World War I Selective Service System Draft Re-
gistration Cards.
48 István Kornél Vida, “Hungarian Americans” in Ethnic and Racial Minorities in the U.S. Military. An En-
cyclopedia. Vol I, ed. Alexander M. Bielakowski (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 311.
49 Kennedy, Over Here, 67–68.
21AustriA-HungAry And tHe AmericAn Belligerence in World WAr one
Pro&Contra 2 (2018) 5–24.
launching the entire enterprise was not widely regarded as one. Consequently, Hungarian 
immigrants in America were not considered villainous unlike their German counterparts.
This essay has examined this apparent paradox by outlining the background to this 
historiographical problem. It is acknowledged that this has been merely scratching the 
surface of  the issues regarding the enemy alien question. Researching the state of  all the 
different minorities living in the United States in the years of  the war could, and would 
deserve to, fill volumes. There have been interesting studies about minorities in Great 
Britain, Germany, France, and the Ottoman Empire published recently,50 but unfortunate-
ly, Hungarian-Americans were omitted from this research. A detailed analysis is beyond 
the scope of  this paper, but it is hoped that this paper will be the springboard for further 
research focused on the way Hungarians lived and experienced the Great War as enemy 
aliens in the USA.
50 Hannah Ewence and Tim Grady (eds), Minorities and the First World War. From War to Peace (London: 
Palgrave, 2017).
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